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INTRODUCTION 
 
[1]  In many ways, communicating by e-mail and other forms of electronic 
transmission reflects a fundamentally different way of human interaction.  
Historians eventually will put this in perspective, but one could easily 
conclude that e-mails are essentially a “third way” for people to 
communicate.  
 
[2]  From the dawn of time, people have communicated either orally or in 
some permanent form.  The former started with grunts among cavemen, 
and now includes telephone calls.  This oral tradition involves fleeting 
communications, never meant to last.  Oral communications convey 
messages as much through body language or tone of voice as they do 
through the actual words.  The primeval human belief that these 
communications should not be permanently recorded reflects itself in state 
laws prohibiting one participant in a telephone call from tape recording 
that call without the other’s consent. 
 
[3]  The permanent form of communication started with clay tablets, and 
now includes faxes.  Folks using this written tradition expect the writing to 
last, and therefore usually (but not always) use care in choosing what they 
write.  The words themselves convey the meaning, perhaps slightly 
supplemented by exclamation points, question marks, etc. 
 
                                                 
∗ Thomas E. Spahn received his Bachelor of Arts and his Juris Doctor from Yale 
University.  Mr. Spahn is a partner at McGuire Woods, LLP in McLean, Virginia. 
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[4]  E-mails combine these two forms of communication in a unique way.  
They combine the informality and sometimes careless substance of oral 
communications with the permanence of written communications.  E-
mails have changed the way we communicate in three fundamental ways.  
First, e-mails change the substance of our communications.  
Unfortunately, for some litigants, e-mails can be easily misinterpreted.  
What seemed like humor in an e-mail can later haunt the author.  
Discovery now focuses on e-mail because that form of communication 
captures litigants’ and witnesses’ unguarded thoughts in a way that 
provides insight into their thinking.1 
 
[5]  Second, e-mails represent a fundamental change in the way we 
communicate because they can be sent so easily.  In many ways, this ease 
of transmission represents a good development for most e-mail users.  E-
mails allow users to stay in touch with family, friends, and business 
associates more easily.  E-mails make service industries (such as the legal 
profession) more responsive to their clients.  This ease of transmission, 
however, carries downside risks for the sloppy and inattentive.  In some 
situations, the sender intends to transmit e-mails using this easy method.  
It can be as easy to send an e-mail to one hundred recipients as it is to one 
recipient.  This has enormous ramifications for the attorney-client 
privilege, which rests its protection on clients and lawyers communicating 
only among themselves,2 or a very select group of others with a “need to 
know.”  Some recent decisions (which are outside the subject of this 
article about ethics) have jeopardized every American corporation’s 
attorney-client privilege, by finding that widespread intra-corporate 
circulation of e-mails essentially demonstrates that the e-mails relate to a 
business rather than a legal purpose.3 
 
[6]  Everyone has also sent e-mails to unintended recipients, often because 
of the software that fills in the names of recipients after senders type in 
                                                 
1 See M. James Thomas, At the Intersection of Privilege and E-Discovery, 44 TENN. B.J. 
14, 16 (2008) (“The amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on discovery 
now apply to ESI, including individual e-mails, e-mail strings or strands, and soft copy 
attachments.”). 
2 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 3 (2000). 
3 In re Seroquel Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 6:06-md-1769-Orl-22DAB, 2008 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 39467, at *96 (M.D. Fla. May 7, 2008); In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 501 F. 
Supp. 2d 789, 809-10 (E.D. La. 2007). 
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just a few letters of an e-mail address.  The law has always had to deal 
with the inadvertent transmission of privileged or otherwise confidential 
communications, but e-mails clearly exacerbate that problem.4 
 
[7]  Third, e-mails involve the astounding increase in volume of such 
communications.  The advent of copy machines might have created a 
flood of communications, but e-mails have generated a tsunami.  In 
addition to all of the technological challenges that this huge increase in 
volume generates, the law of discovery has had to keep up.  The new Rule 
502 of the Federal Rules of Evidence represents the latest attempt to 
update discovery rules in light of the increasing amount of material that 
litigants must review and produce.5 
 
[8]  As indicated above, the enormous changes triggered by e-mail 
communication play out in many legal contexts—including the attorney-
client privilege, discovery rules, and elsewhere.6  This brief article 
analyzes how the changes affect the ethics rules that guide the legal 
profession’s conduct.  It makes sense to focus on the audience with which 
lawyers communicate by e-mail.  First, and perhaps most importantly, the 
ethics rules have had to deal with lawyers’ communications with their 
clients’ adversaries.  Second, ethics rules must deal with lawyers’ 
communications with third parties other than their adversaries.  Third, the 
ethics rules have had to adapt to a number of issues arising in litigation.   
 
I.  COMMUNICATING WITH ADVERSARIES 
 
A.  UNSOLICITED E-MAILS FROM PROSPECTIVE CLIENTS 
 
[9]  There may be no better example of the ethical impact of e-mails than 
state bars’ efforts to analyze how they affect the very creation of an 
attorney-client relationship.  All lawyers know that they must preserve 
                                                 
4 See generally Thomas E. Spahn, Litigation Ethics in the Modern Age, 33 The Brief 2 
(2004), available at http://www.mcguirewoods.com/news-
resources/publications/commercial_litigation/LitigationEthics.Brief.33.2.Winter2004.pdf 
(discussing the frequent inadvertent e-mail communications and the associated unethical 
conduct). 
5 See FED. R. EVID. 502. 
6 See, e.g., PAUL R. RICE, Att’y-Client Privilege in the U.S. § 5:20 (West Group 1999). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
 4
their clients’ confidences.7  Bars, however, have to deal with how lawyers 
should handle confidential information they learn from prospective clients, 
even if an attorney-client relationship never develops.8  Lawyers have 
always faced this issue, but the advent of e-mails has allowed prospective 
clients to easily transmit confidential communications to many lawyers.  
Sometimes clients are legitimately seeking lawyers to represent them, 
while others are cynically trying to disqualify lawyers who might 
represent their adversaries. 
 
[10]  This scenario also implicates conflicts of interest rules, which supply 
a fairly easy but seemingly harsh answer.  Nationwide, bars have 
repeatedly held that a lawyer who learns confidential information while 
interviewing a prospective client cannot (absent consent) later be adverse 
to the prospective client, even if no attorney-client relationship ever 
arises.9 
 
[11]  This well-recognized principle requires lawyers who meet with or 
otherwise receive information from prospective clients to walk a 
“tightrope”—obtaining enough general information from the prospective 
client to run a conflicts search, while not acquiring so much information 
that the prospective client will be considered an actual client for conflicts 
purposes.10  A number of law firms have learned to their regret that one of 
their partners or associates crossed the line and created a disabling conflict 
by acquiring too much information from a prospective client. 
 
[12]  A rule requiring a lawyer to maintain the confidentiality of 
information received from a prospective client, however, makes much less 
sense if the prospective client sends unsolicited information to the lawyer.  
A strict application of the confidentiality and conflicts rules in such a 
setting might tempt clever litigants to purposely taint their adversary’s 
potential lawyers by sending unsolicited confidential information to them.  
Still, the confidentiality rules do seem fairly strong even with prospective 
clients who never become actual clients. 
 
                                                 
7 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a). 
8 Id. R. 1.18(b). 
9 See id. R. 1.18(c). 
10 See id. R. 1.18(c)-(d). 
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[13]  This issue becomes more complicated if the information obtained 
from the prospective client is of interest to an existing client.  In that 
situation, the possible duty to keep the prospective client’s information 
secret runs directly contrary to what would otherwise be a clear fiduciary 
duty to reveal the material information to the existing client.11  If a lawyer 
received information “on the street” that a plaintiff was about to file a 
lawsuit against the lawyer’s client, fiduciary duties probably would require 
the lawyer to immediately advise the client.  Do these fiduciary duties 
apply with equal force to an unsolicited e-mail from a prospective client?  
The answer is unclear. 
 
[14]  Since the advent of e-mails, bars across America have dealt with this 
issue—with mixed results.  In 2001, the New York City Bar essentially 
adopted the approach of Rule 1.18 of the  ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct (discussed below).12  The New York City Bar took a 
very lawyer-friendly approach. 
 
Information imparted in good faith by a prospective client 
to a lawyer or law firm in an e-mail generated in response 
to an internet web site maintained by the lawyer or law firm 
where such information is adverse to the interests of the 
prospective client generally would not disqualify the law 
firm from representing another present or future client in 
the same matter.  Where the web site does not adequately 
warn that information transmitted to the lawyer or firm will 
not be treated as confidential, the information should be 
held in confidence by the attorney receiving the 
communication and not disclosed to or used for the benefit 
of the other client even though the attorney declines to 
represent the potential client.13 
 
In discussing law firms’ websites, the New York City Bar indicated that 
 
                                                 
11 See id. R. 1.7(a). 
12 The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal 
Op. 2001-1 (2001). 
13 Id. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
 6
The fact that the law firm maintained a web site does not, 
standing alone, alter our view that the transmitted 
information was unsolicited.  The fact that a law firm’s web 
site has a link to send an e-mail to the firm does not mean 
that the firm has solicited the transmission of confidential 
information from a prospective client.  The Committee 
believes that there is a fundamental distinction between a 
specific request for, or a solicitation of, information about a 
client by a lawyer and advertising a law firm’s general 
availability to accept clients, which has been traditionally 
done through legal directories, such as Martindale Hubbell, 
and now is also routinely done through television, the print 
media and web sites on the internet.14 
The New York City Bar assured lawyers that a law firm website 
disclaimer that 
 
[P]rominently and specifically warns prospective clients 
not to send any confidential information in response to the 
web site because nothing will necessarily be treated as 
confidential until the prospective client has spoken to an 
attorney who has completed a conflicts check . . . would 
vitiate any attorney-client privilege claim with respect to 
information transmitted in the face of such a warning.15 
 
[15]  Several years later, the Nevada Bar took essentially the same 
approach.16  In 2005, the Nevada Bar indicated that prospective clients 
generally could not create an attorney-client relationship through a 
“unilateral act” such as “sending an unsolicited letter containing 
confidential information to the attorney.”17  The Nevada Bar explained 
that a lawyer’s website disclaimer should effectively eliminate any 
                                                 
14 Id. 
15 Id. (footnotes omitted). 
16 See generally State Bar of Nev. Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal 
Op. 32 (2005) (discussing the formation of the attorney-client relationship in the context 
of the Internet and electronic communication). 
17 Id. 
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reasonable expectation of confidentiality by someone sending an 
unsolicited e-mail to the lawyer.18 
 
[16]  In 2006, the San Diego Bar also took this approach, but in a different 
factual context.  In San Diego LEO 2006-1, the San Diego Bar addressed a 
hypothetical situation in which a lawyer received an unsolicited e-mail.19  
The Bar began its analysis by assuming that the lawyer did not have a 
website and did not advertise, although the state Bar publicized her e-mail 
address.20  The majority indicated that the prospective client’s 
 
[U]nsolicited e-mail is not confidential.  Private 
information received from a non-client via an unsolicited 
e-mail is not required to be held as confidential by a 
lawyer, if the lawyer has not had an opportunity to warn or 
stop the flow of non-client information at or before the 
communication is delivered.21 
 
The San Diego Bar stated that the lawyer may continue to represent the 
other injured accident victim and use the information against the e-mail’s 
author.22  The San Diego Bar indicated that it would be a “closer question” 
if the lawyer had included her e-mail address at the bottom of an 
advertisement without any disclaimers.23  In that situation, there would be 
an “inference that private information divulged to the attorney would be 
confidential.”24  A dissenting opinion argued:  “I would err on the side of 
the consumer and find that there is a reasonable expectation of 
confidentiality on behalf of the consumer sending an e-mail to an attorney 
with the information necessary to seek legal advice.”25 
 
                                                 
18 Id. 
19 See generally San Diego Cal. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1 (2006) 
(discussing the duty of confidentiality with unsolicited communications by e-mail). 
20 See id. 
21 Id. 
22 See id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
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[17]  In 2007, the Massachusetts Bar took a dramatically different 
approach.26  In direct contrast to the New York City analysis, the 
Massachusetts Bar indicated that a lawyer could control the flow of 
information by using a click-through disclaimer.27 
 
[W]hen an e-mail is sent using a link on a law firm’s web 
site, the firm has an opportunity to set conditions on the 
flow of information.  Using readily available technology, 
the firm may require a prospective client to review and 
‘click’ his assent to terms of use before using an e-mail 
link.  Such terms of use might include a provision that any 
information communicated before the firm agrees to 
represent the prospective client will not be treated as 
confidential.  Or the terms of use could provide that receipt 
of information from a prospective client will not prevent 
the firm from representing someone else in the matter.28 
 
The Massachusetts Bar explained that depending on the kind of 
information conveyed in the unsolicited e-mail, a law firm’s receipt of 
confidential information from a law firm client’s adversary might 
“materially limit” the law firm’s ability to represent its client, thus 
resulting in the law firm’s disqualification.29  The Massachusetts Bar 
concluded that “a law firm can avoid disqualification by requiring 
prospective clients to affirmatively indicate their consent to appropriate 
terms of use before using an e-mail link provided on the firm’s website.”30 
 
[18]  Most recently, the Virginia Bar adopted a majority approach, 
indicating that lawyers receiving confidential information in unsolicited e-
mails or voicemails from prospective clients do not have a duty to keep 
that information confidential.31   
 
                                                 
26 See generally Mass. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2007-1 (2007) (discussing the 
duty owed to former clients). 
27 See id. 
28 Id. 
29 See id. 
30 Id. cmt. 1. 
31 See Va. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 1842 (2008). 
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[19]  In trying to deal with all of these issues, the ABA added Rule 1.18 of 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.32  That rule (“Duties to 
Prospective Client”) starts with the bedrock principle that a person will be 
considered a “prospective client” if the person discusses with a lawyer 
“the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship.”33  The lawyer 
must treat such a person as a former client for conflicts purposes.34  A 
lawyer in such a situation may not represent the adversary in the same or 
substantially related matter—if “the lawyer received information from the 
prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the 
matter.”35  This would allow the lawyer more flexibility than the standard 
rule, which would have prevented the lawyer’s representation of the 
adversary if the lawyer had received any pertinent confidential 
information from the prospective client and not just information that 
“could be significantly harmful” to the prospective client.36 
 
[20]  Finally, any individual lawyer’s disqualification even under that 
standard is not imputed to the entire law firm if the lawyer had taken 
“reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information 
than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the 
prospective client," and if the individually disqualified lawyer is screened 
from the matter (including financially screened) and provides written 
notice to the prospective client.37 
 
[21]  The second comment of Rule 1.18 of the ABA Model Rules of 
Professional Conduct provides some guidance that could apply to 
unsolicited e-mails. 
 
Not all persons who communicate information to a lawyer 
are entitled to protection under this Rule.  A person who 
communicates information unilaterally to a lawyer, without 
any reasonable expectation that the lawyer is willing to 
discuss the possibility of forming a client-lawyer 
                                                 
32 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.18 (2000). 
33 Id. R. 1.18(a). 
34 Id. R. 1.18(b); see id. R. 1.9 (2000). 
35 Id. R. 1.18(c). 
36 Id. 
37 Id. R. 1.18(d)(2). 
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relationship, is not a “prospective client” within the 
meaning of paragraph (a).38 
 
As with all ABA Model Rule changes, it will take time to see if states 
ultimately follow the same approach. 
 
[22]  Ironically, e-mail communications can also make it difficult to 
analyze the other end of an attorney-client relationship.  Under Rule 1.7 of 
the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers cannot take on 
any matter adverse to a current client without that client’s consent.39  In 
contrast, Rule 1.9 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
permits lawyers to take on matters adverse to former clients, unless the 
client formerly represented a client in the same or substantially related 
matter, or otherwise acquired confidences from the client that the lawyer 
could now use against him.40  Thus, it can be critically important to know 
whether there is a current attorney-client relationship when analyzing 
conflicts.  Many law firms send various complimentary e-mail “alerts” to 
both current clients and former clients.  To the extent that lawyers 
continue to treat a former client as if he were currently a client (by sending 
e-mail alerts or otherwise), those lawyers might find themselves facing the 
much more stringent conflicts rules governing adversity to current clients. 
 
B.  EX PARTE CONTACTS WITH ADVERSARIES 
 
[23]  The ease of e-mail transmissions sometimes implicate Rule 4.2 of the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, another basic ethics rule 
dealing with lawyers’ communications with represented adversaries.41  As 
with the issue of communications from prospective clients, the spread of 
e-mail communications has not created a brand-new issue, but made an 
existing issue more difficult to tackle.  
 
[24]  The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct contain a fairly 
simple prohibition that generates a nearly endless series of issues: 
 
                                                 
38 Id. R. 1.18(a) cmt. 2. 
39 Id. R. 1.7. 
40 Id. R. 1.9. 
41 See id. R. 4.2. 
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In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate 
about the subject of the representation with a person the 
lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the 
matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other 
lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.42 
 
This prohibition rests on several basic principles: 
 
This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal 
system by protecting a person who has chosen to be 
represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible 
overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the 
matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer 
relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information 
relating to the representation.43 
 
As one analyzes application of the basic prohibition, it becomes apparent 
that the more important principle underlying the rule is the need to avoid 
interference between a client’s and lawyer’s relationship.  For instance, the 
prohibition extends to many types of communications that could not 
possibly involve a lawyer’s “overreaching.”44 
 
[25]  The Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers follows 
essentially the same approach, although with a few more variations: 
 
 (1) A lawyer representing a client in a matter may 
not communicate about the subject of the representation 
with a nonclient whom the lawyer knows to be represented 
in the matter by another lawyer or with a representative of 
an organizational nonclient so represented as defined in § 
100, unless:  
  (a) the communication is with a public 
 officer or agency to the extent stated in § 101;  
  (b) the lawyer is a party and represents no 
 other client in the matter;  
                                                 
42 Id. 
43 Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 1. 
44 See id. 
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  (c) the communication is authorized by law;  
  (d) the communication reasonably responds 
 to an emergency; or  
  (e) the  other lawyer consents.45 
 
The Restatement recognizes the two same basic principles underlying the 
prohibition:  “The rules stated in §§ 99-103, protect against overreaching 
and deception of nonclients.  The rule of [Section 99] also protects the 
relationship between the represented nonclient and that person’s lawyer 
and assures the confidentiality of the nonclient’s communications with the 
lawyer.”46 
 
[26]  The language of Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct and the Restatement involves several important issues.  First, 
courts and bars might have to determine whether there is a matter 
sufficient to trigger the Rule 4.2 prohibition.  For instance, in Alaska 
Ethics Opinion 2006-1, on January 27, 2006, the Alaska Bar dealt with 
situations in which a lawyer has a consumer complaint about a local 
company, disagrees with a local newspaper’s editorial policy, or has 
concerns as a homeowner with a municipal government’s decision on a 
building permit.47  Among other things, the Alaska Bar discussed whether 
any of the scenarios involved a matter in which the store, newspaper, or 
government is represented: 
 
 In the three examples set forth above, the key 
question posed in each instance is whether there is a 
“matter” that is “the subject of the representation.”  An 
initial contact to attempt to obtain information or to resolve 
a conflict informally rarely involves a matter that is known 
to be the subject of representation.  Consequently, lawyers, 
representing clients or themselves, ordinarily are free to 
contact institutions that regularly retain counsel in an 
attempt to obtain information or to resolve a problem 
informally.  These sorts of contacts frequently resolve a 
potential dispute long before it becomes a “matter” that is 
                                                 
45 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99(1) (2000). 
46 Id. § 99 cmt. b (citations omitted). 
47 See Alaska Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-1 (2006). 
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“the subject of representation.”  The above examples are all 
worded to suggest the inquiry occurs at the early stage of a 
consumer or citizen complaint.  Inquiries directed to 
employees and managers would be proper in each 
instance.48 
 
The Alaska Bar concluded that: 
 The line between permitted contacts at the early 
stage of a potential matter and forbidden contacts after a 
dispute has sharpened and become a “matter that is the 
subject of representation” depends on the question 
discussed in the preceding section:  Until the lawyer knows 
that an opposing counsel has been asked by the party to 
deal with the particular new matter, the lawyer is not 
prohibited from dealing directly with representatives of the 
party.49 
 
[27]  Second, courts and bars might have to determine whether a lawyer 
engaging in such an ex parte contact is doing so in “representing a 
client.”50  In some situations involving ex parte contacts, lawyers are not 
acting as client representatives.  For instance, Maryland Ethics Opinion 
2006-7 states that a lawyer appointed by the court as guardian of the 
property of a disabled nursing home resident may communicate directly 
with the nursing facility, even though the facility is represented by a 
lawyer.51  The Maryland Bar contrasted the role of a guardian with that of 
a lawyer: 
 
“A guardian is not an agent of a ward, because guardians 
are not subject to the ward’s control; rather, the guardians 
serve a unique role as agents of the court.  In reality the 
court is the guardian; an individual who is given that title is 
merely an agent or arm of that tribunal in carrying out its 
                                                 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50  See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000). 
51 See Md. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-7 (2006). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
 14
sacred responsibility.  Thus, a ward may not select, instruct, 
terminate, or otherwise control his guardian.”   
 In contrast, an attorney-client relationship is “an 
agent-principal relationship.”  “A client’s right to select and 
direct his or her attorney is a fundamental aspect of 
attorney-client relations.  Thus, the principal-agent 
relationship between a client and an attorney is always a 
consensual one.”   From this explication, it does not 
appear that the member appointed by the court as Guardian 
“represents” the Resident . . . no attorney-client relationship 
exists, only a guardian-ward relationship.  Accordingly, 
MRPC 4.2 is not applicable to communications between 
the Guardian and the Nursing Facility.52  
 
[28]  The restriction on ex parte communications to situations in which a 
lawyer is “representing a client” also allows clients to seek “second 
opinions” from other lawyers—because those other lawyers are not 
“representing a client” in that matter:53 
 
 A lawyer who does not represent a person in the 
matter and who is approached by an already-represented 
person seeking a second professional opinion or wishing to 
discuss changing lawyers or retaining additional counsel, 
may, without consent from or notice to the original lawyer, 
respond to the request, including giving an opinion 
concerning the propriety of the first lawyer’s 
representation.54 
 
[29]  Third, similar to other situations involving conflicts of interests, 
courts and bars might have to determine whether the other person is 
                                                 
52 Id. (citations omitted). 
53 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 cmt. 4 (2000) (“Nor does this Rule 
preclude communication with a represented person who is seeking advice from a lawyer 
who is not otherwise representing a client in the matter.”); see also id.  R. 4.2 cmt. 8 
(“The prohibition on communication with a represented person only applies in 
circumstances where the lawyer knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter 
to be discussed.”). 
54 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. c (2000). 
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“represented by another lawyer.”55  In class action situations, this issue 
normally involves a debate about whether the attorney-client relationship 
has begun.  The Restatement explains the majority position on this issue: 
 
 A lawyer who represents a client opposing a class in 
a class action is subject to the anticontact rule of this 
Section.  For the purposes of this Section, according to the 
majority of decisions, once the proceeding has been 
certified as a class action, the members of the class are 
considered clients of the lawyer for the class; prior to 
certification, only those class members with whom the 
lawyer maintains a personal client-lawyer relationship are 
clients.  Prior to certification and unless the court orders 
otherwise, in the case of competing putative class actions a 
lawyer for one set of representatives may contact class 
members who are only putatively represented by a 
competing lawyer, but not class representatives or members 
known to be directly represented in the matter by the other 
lawyer.56 
 
An ABA legal ethics opinion has also taken the following approach.  In 
the class action context, “a client-lawyer relationship with a potential 
member of the class does not begin until the class has been certified and 
                                                 
55 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (emphasis added). 
56 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. l (2000); see 
Debra Lyn Bassett, Pre-Certification Communication Ethics in Class Actions, 36 GA. L. 
REV. 353, 355-56 (2002) (“The majority view, embraced by most courts, the 
Restatement, and the leading class action treatise, holds that before class certification, 
putative class members are not ‘represented’ by class counsel.”); Phila. Bar Ass’n on 
Ethics, Formal Op. 2006-6 (2006) (stating that a defense lawyer may engage in ex parte 
communications with purported class members before a class certification).  The 
Philadelphia Bar Association also states, “[t]he majority rule in most jurisdictions is that, 
after a class action is filed but prior to certification of a class, contact between counsel for 
a defendant and members of the putative class is permitted,” citing to the Restatement 
that the ex parte contact would be with sophisticated corporations rather than 
unsophisticated individuals and that the lawyer must make the recipients of the 
communications aware of the pending class action.  See Blanchard v. Edgemark Fin. 
Corp., No. 94 C 1890, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15420, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 11, 1998) 
(recognizing that class members are represented “once a class has been certified”) 
(quoting MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 30.2, at 234 (3d ed. 1995)). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
 16
the time for opting out by a potential member of the class has expired.”57  
Therefore, Rules 4.2 and 7.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct “do not generally prohibit counsel for either plaintiff or defendant 
from communicating with persons who may in the future become 
members of the class.”58  The opinion further determines both lawyers 
must comply with Rule 4.3 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct if they communicate with potential class members, and that 
plaintiffs’ lawyer must comply with Rule 7.3 if they are soliciting 
membership in the class, but those restrictions “do not apply to contacting 
potential class members as witnesses.”59  The opinion states “[b]oth 
plaintiffs’ counsel and defense counsel have legitimate need to reach out 
to potential class members regarding the facts that are the subject of the 
potential class action, including information that may be relevant to 
whether or not a class should be certified”60 and that  
 
Restricting defense communication with potential plaintiffs 
could inhibit the defendant from taking remedial measures 
to alleviate a harmful or dangerous condition that has led to 
the lawsuit.  A defendant in a class action lawsuit also 
would be prevented from attempting to reach conciliation 
agreements with members of the potential class without 
going through a lawyer whom the potential class member 
may have no interest in retaining.61 
 
Of course, however, “the court may assume control over communications 
by counsel with class members.”62 
 
[30]  In other situations, the debate focuses on whether the attorney-client 
relationship has ended.  For example, in K-Mart Corp. v. Helton,63 the 
Kentucky Supreme Court found that  
 
                                                 
57 See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 07-445 
(2007). 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 894 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. 1995). 
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 The Court of Appeals correctly observed that the 
continued representation of an individual after the 
conclusion of a proceeding is not necessarily presumed and 
that the passage of time may be a reasonable ground to 
believe that a person is no longer represented by a 
particular lawyer.  Rule 4.2 is not intended to prohibit all 
direct contact in such circumstances.  Here counsel for 
plaintiffs had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
petitioners were not represented by counsel when he took 
the Pittman statement.  In considering the fact that no 
contact was made by an attorney on behalf of K-Mart until 
more than one year after the incident which gave rise to this 
action and almost one year after plaintiffs’ counsel took the 
statement, we believe that the communication with the K-
Mart employee was not with a party the attorney knew was 
represented by another attorney in the matter.64 
 
[31]  Fourth, courts and bars might have to determine if the lawyer making 
ex parte contacts “knows” that the other person is represented by another 
lawyer in the matter. Rule 1.0(f) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct defines “knows” as denoting “actual knowledge of the fact in 
question.  A person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances.”65  
Comment 8 to Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 
explains that:   
 
The prohibition on communications with a represented 
person only applies in circumstances where the lawyer 
knows that the person is in fact represented in the matter to 
be discussed.  This means that the lawyer has actual 
knowledge of the fact of the representation; but such actual 
knowledge may be inferred from the circumstances.  See 
Rule 1.0(f).  Thus, the lawyer cannot evade the requirement 
of obtaining the consent of counsel by closing eyes to the 
obvious.66 
 
                                                 
64 Id. at 631. 
65 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.0(f) (2000).  
66 Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 8 (emphasis added). 
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The ABA has also explained that: 
 
[I]n the Committee’s view, Rule 4.2 does not, like Rule 4.3 
[governing a lawyer’s communications with an 
unrepresented person], imply a duty to inquire.  
Nonetheless, it bears emphasis that, as stated in the 
definition of “knows” . . . actual knowledge may be 
inferred from the circumstances.  It follows, therefore, that 
a lawyer may not avoid Rule 4.2’s bar against 
communication with a represented person simply by 
closing her eyes to the obvious.67 
 
[32]  Fifth, courts and bars might have to determine if an ex parte contact 
constitutes a “communication” for purposes of Rule 4.2 of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct.  For instance, in Hill v. Shell Oil 
Co.,68 plaintiffs filed a class action suit against Shell gas stations, claiming 
that they discriminated against African-American customers.69  The 
previous six years, plaintiffs arranged for assistants posing as consumers 
to interact with Shell gas station employees, videotaping what they alleged 
to be racial discrimination.70  When Shell discovered this type of 
investigation, it moved for a protective order to prohibit any further such 
contacts.71  The United States District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois denied the protective order, finding that while the gas station 
managers were in the Rule 4.2 “off-limits” category, the contacts between 
the investigators and the gas station employees did not constitute 
“communications” sufficient to trigger the Rule 4.2 prohibition.72  The 
court stated,  
 
 Here we have secret videotapes of station 
employees reacting (or not reacting) to plaintiffs and other 
persons posing as consumers.  Most of the interactions that 
                                                 
67 ABA Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 (1995) (emphasis 
added). 
68 209 F. Supp. 2d 876 (N.D. Ill. 2002). 
 
69 Id. at 877. 
70 See id. 
71 See id. 
72 See id. at 879-80. 
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occurred in the videotapes do not involve any questioning 
of the employees other than asking if a gas pump is prepay 
or not, and as far as we can tell these conversations are not 
within the audio range of the video camera.  These 
interactions do not rise to the level of communication 
protected by Rule 4.2.  To the extent that employees and 
plaintiffs have substantive conversations outside of normal 
business transactions, we will consider whether to bar that 
evidence when and if it is offered at trial.73 
 
[33]  Courts take Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct very seriously.  For instance, in In re Allan K. Knappenberger,74 
two law firm employees filed an employment-related lawsuit against a 
lawyer.75  After the lawyer received service of the Summons and 
Complaint late on a Friday afternoon, he confronted one of the employees 
and “ask[ed], in an angry tone, what it was and whose idea it had been.”76  
It was apparently undisputed that “[t]he entire conversation lasted between 
30 seconds and one minute.”77  The lawyer spoke the next day to the other 
plaintiff who had sued him—in a conversation that lasted between 5 and 
20 minutes.78  Both of the plaintiffs reported these contacts to their 
lawyers, who amended the complaint, to add a retaliation claim.79  The 
Oregon Supreme Court found that the lawyer had violated the ex parte 
contact prohibition, and suspended him for 120 days.80  The court noted in 
passing, but ultimately found irrelevant, the fact that the lawyer ultimately 
won the lawsuit brought by his employees.81 
 
[34]  The general rule applies even to lawyers sending copies of pleadings 
to represented adversaries: 
 
                                                 
73 Id. at 880. 
74 108 P.3d 1161 (Or. 2005). 
75 Id. at 1163.  
76 Id.  
77 Id. (emphasis added). 
78 Id.  
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1172. 
81 See id. at 1163 (emphasis added). 
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Under the anti-contact rule of this Section, a lawyer 
ordinarily is not authorized to communicate with a 
represented nonclient even by letter with a copy to the 
opposite lawyer or even if the opposite lawyer wrongfully 
fails to convey important information to that lawyer’s 
client, such as a settlement offer.82  
 
[35]  Rule 4.2 of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and every 
state’s variation require the consent of the other person’s lawyer. 83  The 
other person’s consent does not suffice.84  Comment 3 to Rule 4.2 states, 
“The Rule applies even though the represented person initiates or consents 
to the communication.  A lawyer must immediately terminate 
communication with a person if, after commencing communication, the 
lawyer learns that the person is one with whom communication is not 
permitted by this Rule.”85 
 
[36]  The Restatement takes the same approach.  Comment B in Section 
99 of the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers states that 
the “general exception to the rule . . . requires consent of the opposing 
lawyer; consent of the client alone does not suffice.”86  Another comment 
states that the “anti-contact rule applies to any communication relating to 
the lawyer’s representation in the matter, whoever initiates the contact and 
regardless of the content of the ensuing communication.”87  Another 
example is a New York City Bar Association legal ethics opinion which 
applied the ex parte prohibition even to communications initiated by a 
“sophisticated non-lawyer insurance adjuster.”88   
 
[37]  Ignoring this rule can cause real damage.  In Inorganic Coatings, Inc. 
v. Falberg,89 for example, a lawyer for Inorganic Coatings sent a letter to 
                                                 
82See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. f (2000) 
(citations omitted). 
83 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.2 (2000). 
84 Id. R. 4.2 cmt. 3.  
85 Id. 
86 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 99 cmt. b (2000).  
87 Id. § 99 cmt. f. 
88 See The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, 
Formal Op. 2005-04 (2005). 
89 926 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Pa. 1995). 
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an International Zinc official (Falberg) threatening to sue his company for 
certain conduct.90  Inorganic’s lawyer later spoke with International Zinc’s 
lawyer about a possible settlement, but the conversation was 
unsuccessful.91  Later the same day, the lawyer received a telephone call 
from Falberg.92  Inorganic’s lawyer advised Falberg that “it would be 
best” if the communication took place between the lawyers, but did not 
terminate the conversation.93  The lawyer spoke with Falberg for about 
ninety minutes and took twenty-four pages of notes.94  Among other 
things, he used the information to revise his draft complaint.95  The court 
found that Inorganic’s lawyer had violated the state ethics code prohibition 
on such ex parte contacts, and disqualified the lawyer and his firm from 
representing Inorganic even though they had been engaged for over one 
year in investigating and preparing the lawsuit.96 
 
[38]  It may seem counter-intuitive, but a lawyer takes an enormous risk 
by accepting at face value even a highly sophisticated person’s assurance 
that the person’s lawyer has consented to an ex parte communication.97 
Courts and bars have wrestled with a lawyer’s obligations if the person 
indicates that she has fired her lawyer.  The ABA has stated that a lawyer 
may proceed with an ex parte communication with a person only if the 
lawyer has “reasonable assurance” that the representation has ended.98  On 
the other hand, the Texas Supreme Court has held,  
 
Rule 4.02 does not require an attorney to contact a person’s 
former attorney to confirm the person’s statement that 
representation has been terminated before communicating 
with the person.  Confirmation may be necessary in some 
                                                 
90 See id. at 518. 
91 See id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id.   
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 521. 
97 See The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, 
Formal Op. 2005-04 (2005) (“A lawyer who proceeds on the basis of other evidence of 
consent, such as the opposing client’s assurance that its counsel has consented, runs the 
risk of violating the rule if opposing counsel did not in fact consent.”). 
98 See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-396 
(1995).  
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circumstances before an attorney can determine whether a 
person is no longer represented, but it is not required by 
Rule 4.02 in every situation, and for good reason.  The 
attorney may not be able to provide confirmation if, as in 
this case, he and his client have not communicated.  And 
while a client should certainly be expected to communicate 
with his attorney about discontinuing representation, the 
client in some circumstances may have reasons for not 
doing so immediately.99 
 
E-mail communications implicate all of these traditional ethics issues.  
 
C.  INADVERTENT TRANSMISSION OF COMMUNICATIONS 
 
[39]  As indicated above, the ease of communicating by e-mail has 
affected many legal issues in the context of intentionally transmitted e-
mails.  Most importantly, clients’ and lawyers’ intentional widespread 
transmission of e-mails implicates attorney-client privilege issues.  The 
ethics rules primarily deal with the other kind of transmission—the 
unintentional (usually called “inadvertent”) transmission of e-mails.  This 
issue has vexed the ABA, state bars, and state courts for many years. 
 
[40]  In the early 1990s, the ABA tended to favor requiring the return of 
such documents, but recently, however, the ABA shifted its course.  It will 
be interesting to see if the ABA’s retreat from its earlier position generates 
a similar approach by bars and courts.  In 1992, the ABA issued a 
surprisingly strong opinion directing lawyers to return obviously 
privileged or confidential documents inadvertently sent to them outside 
the document production context.100  The ABA indicated that: 
 
[A]s a matter of ethical conduct contemplated by the 
precepts underlying the Model Rules, [the lawyer] (a) 
should not examine the [privileged] materials once the 
inadvertence is discovered, (b) should notify the sending 
                                                 
99 In re Users Sys. Servs., Inc., 22 S.W.3d 331, 334-35 (Tex. 1999). 
100 See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 92-368 
(1992). 
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lawyer of their receipt and (c) should abide by the sending 
lawyer’s instructions as to their disposition.101 
 
As explained below, many bars and courts took the ABA’s lead in 
imposing some duty on lawyers receiving obviously privileged or 
confidential documents to return them forthwith. 
 
[41]  The ABA, however, recently retreated from this position.  As a result 
of the Ethics 2000 Task Force Recommendations, Rule 4.4(b) of the ABA 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct now indicates that “[a] lawyer who 
receives a document relating to the representation of the lawyer’s client 
and knows or reasonably should know that the document was 
inadvertently sent shall promptly notify the sender.” 102  
 
[42]  Comment 2 to Rule 4.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct reveals that, in its current form, the ABA’s approach is both 
broader and narrower than the ABA had earlier announced in its Legal 
Ethics Opinions.103  Rule 4.4(b) is broader because it applies to 
documents “that were mistakenly sent or produced by opposing parties or 
their lawyers,” thus clearly covering document productions.104  The rule is 
narrower than the earlier legal ethics opinion because 
 
If a lawyer knows or reasonably should know that such a 
document was sent inadvertently, then this Rule requires 
the lawyer to promptly notify the sender in order to permit 
that person to take protective measures.  Whether the 
lawyer is required to take additional steps, such as returning 
the original document, is a matter of law beyond the scope 
of these Rules, as is the question of whether the privileged 
status of a document has been waived.  Similarly, this Rule 
does not address the legal duties of a lawyer who receives a 
                                                 
101 Id.  
102 MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4(b) (2000) (emphasis added); see THOMAS 
E. SPAHN, MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N OF AM., LITIG. ETHICS: PART II (DISCOVERY) 
HYPOTHETICALS & ANALYSIS 85 (2007), 
http://www.mortgagebankers.org/files/Conferences/2007/2007LIRC/LitigationEthicsPart
IIH&A.pdf. 
103 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 4.4 cmt. 2. 
104 Id. (emphasis added). 
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document that the lawyer knows or reasonably should 
know may have been wrongfully obtained by the sending 
person.105 
 
[43]  In its new form, the ABA approach defers to case law on the issue of 
whether a lawyer must return such documents, but provides a professional 
“safe harbor” for those who do: 
 
Some lawyers may choose to return a document unread, for 
example, when the lawyer learns before receiving the 
document that it was inadvertently sent to the wrong 
address.  Where a lawyer is not required by applicable law 
to do so, the decision to voluntarily return such a document 
is a matter of professional judgment ordinarily reserved to 
the lawyer.106   
 
Thus, the ABA backed off its strict return requirement and now defers to 
legal principles stated by other bars or courts.  As a result of these changes 
in the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, the ABA took the very 
unusual step of withdrawing the earlier ABA LEO that created the “return 
unread” doctrine.107 
 
[44]  The Restatement would allow use of inadvertently transmitted 
privileged information under certain circumstances: 
 
If the disclosure operates to end legal protection for the 
information, the lawyer may use it for the benefit of the 
lawyer’s own client and may be required to do so if that 
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Id. R. 4.4 cmt. 3. 
107  See ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 
(2005) (discussing inadvertent disclosure of confidential materials).  ABA Model Rule 
4.4(b) now governs the conduct of lawyers who receive inadvertently transmitted 
privileged communications from a third party.  MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 
4.4(b).  Formal Opinion 437 stated that Rule 4.4 “only obligates the receiving lawyer to 
notify the sender of the inadvertent transmission promptly.  The rule does not require the 
receiving lawyer either to refrain from examining the materials or to abide by the 
instructions of the sending lawyer.”  ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l 
Responsibility, Formal Op. 05-437 (2005). 
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would advance the client’s lawful objectives.  That would 
follow, for example, when an opposing lawyer failed to 
object to privileged or immune testimony.  The same legal 
result may follow when divulgence occurs inadvertently 
outside of court.  The receiving lawyer may be required to 
consult with that lawyer’s client about whether to take 
advantage of the lapse. 
 If the person whose information was disclosed is 
entitled to have it suppressed or excluded, the receiving 
lawyer must either return the information or hold it for 
disposition after appropriate notification to the opposing 
person or that person’s counsel.  A court may suppress 
material after an inadvertent disclosure that did not amount 
to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. 
 Where deceitful or illegal means were used to 
obtain the information, the receiving lawyer and that 
lawyer’s client may be liable, among other remedies, for 
damages for harm caused or for injunctive relief against use 
or disclosure.  The receiving lawyer must take steps to 
return such confidential client information and to keep it 
confidential from the lawyer’s own client in the interim. 
 Similarly, if the receiving lawyer is aware that 
disclosure is being made in breach of trust by a lawyer or 
other agent of the opposing person, the receiving lawyer 
must not accept the information.  An offending lawyer may 
be disqualified from further representation in a matter to 
which the information is relevant if the lawyer’s own client 
would otherwise gain a substantial advantage.  A tribunal 
may also order suppression or exclusion of such 
information.108 
 
[45]  State bars have provided varying ethics guidance to lawyers who 
receive inadvertently sent privileged documents outside the document 
production context.  State bars have directed that lawyers: should return 
the documents if the lawyer received them “under circumstances in which 
it is clear that they were not intended for the receiving lawyer,” but should 
                                                 
108 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 60 cmt. m (2000) 
(citations omitted). 
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not be disciplined for attempting to use the documents under a good faith 
argument that the protections had been waived.109 State bars have stated 
that lawyers should return the documents before reviewing them if the 
lawyer receives notice of their inadvertent transmission, but feel free to 
use the inadvertently sent documents if the lawyer reviews them without 
notice of the inadvertent transmission by the sending lawyer.110  State bars 
have also affirmed that lawyers should feel free to retain the inadvertently 
sent documents, but notify the sending lawyer (and send a copy of the 
documents back to the sending lawyer “to ensure that there is no 
misunderstanding about the document in issue.”)111 
 
[46]  Court decisions have also reached differing conclusions.  Some 
courts have allowed lawyers to take advantage of their adversary’s mistake 
in transmitting privileged or confidential documents.112  The courts 
normally do not ever mention the ethics issues, but instead focus on the 
waiver issues.113  Other decisions indicate that lawyers who fail to notify 
the adversary or return inadvertently transmitted privileged documents risk 
                                                 
109 Ky. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. KBA E-374 (1995), 
http://www.kybar.org/documents/ethics_opinions/kba_e-374.pdf. 
110 See Ill. State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Advisory Op. 98-04 (1999); 
see also Va. Bar Ass’n on Ethics, Formal Op. 1702 (1997) (discussing confidentiality 
duties when a lawyer inadvertently receives confidential information without notice).  
The Illinois State Bar Association opinion adopts the reasoning of ABA Formal Op. 368 
(1992) in concluding that a lawyer receiving “inadvertently transmitted confidential 
documents from opposing counsel or opposing counsel’s client” should return the 
documents although prohibiting a lawyer from reading an inadvertently transmitted 
document based on “boilerplate” notices on fax cover pages would “violate reality.”   Ill. 
State Bar Ass’n Advisory Op. on Prof’l Conduct, Adv. Op 98-04 (1999).  Once the 
lawyer recognizes a document as confidential, the lawyer “has an ethical duty to notify 
opposing counsel, to honor opposing counsel’s instructions about disposition of the 
document, and not to use the document in contravention of opposing counsel’s 
instructions.”  Id. 
111 See Me. Bd. of Overseers of the Bar Comm. on the Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 146 
(1994), withdrawn and rev’d Advisory Op. 172 (2000). 
112 See, e.g., FDIC v. Singh, 140 F.R.D. 252, 253 (D. Me. 1992) (“[A]lthough Plaintiff 
produced the memorandum inadvertently, it waived its privilege in the document when 
opposing counsel reviewed it.”); In re Sealed Case, 877 F.2d 976, 980 (D.C. Cir. 1989) 
(“The courts will grant no greater protection to those who assert the privilege than their 
own precautions warrant.”). 
113 See FDIC, 140 F.R.D. at 253 (“The purpose of the privilege is to protect the 
confidences of clients . . . [h]owever, when a document is disclosed, even inadvertently, it 
is no longer held in confidence despite the intentions of the party . . . .”). 
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disqualification or sanctions.114  The California Supreme Court recently 
disqualified a lawyer for reading and relying upon a privileged document 
that the lawyer claims to have inadvertently received from a court reporter 
(although the facts of the case seem to indicate that the lawyer 
surreptitiously purloined the document from the opposing lawyer’s 
briefcase).115 
 
[47]  One might have expected the ethics rules to take a more forgiving 
approach to the increasingly common unintentional transmission of 
communications occurring in the era of e-mail.  The ABA, in taking the 
opposite approach, highlights its emphasis on lawyers’ roles as client 
                                                 
114  See generally Am. Express v. Accu-Weather, Inc., No. 91 CIV. 6485 (RWS), 92 CIV. 
705 (RWS), 1996 WL 346388 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 1996) (imposing sanctions on a lawyer 
for what the court considered the unethical act of opening a Federal Express package and 
reviewing a privileged document after receiving a telephone call from opposing counsel 
informing them of the inadvertent production); Conley, Lott, Nichols Mach. Co. v. 
Brooks, 948 S.W.2d 345, 349 (Tex. App. 1997) (stating that although a lawyer’s failure 
to return a purloined privileged document would not automatically result in 
disqualification, “what he did after he obtained the documents must also be considered” 
and disqualifying the lawyer in this case because his retention and use of the knowingly 
privileged documents amounted to “conduct [that] fell short of the standard that an 
attorney who receives unsolicited confidential information must follow.”), rev’d sub nom. 
In re Meador, 968 S.W.2d 346 (Tex. 1998) (holding that it is difficult to assign a bright 
line standard for disqualification where an attorney, through no wrongdoing, receives an 
opponent’s privileged material). 
115  See Rico v. Mitsubishi Motors Corp., 171 P.3d 1092, 1094 (Cal. 2007).  In Rico, the 
plaintiff’s lawyer came into possession of the defendant’s counsel’s personal notes of a 
previous session with defendant’s expert.  Id. at 1095.  Plaintiff’s counsel made copies 
for other counsel and for plaintiff’s experts to study.  Id. at 1100.  The notes were then 
used by the plaintiff’s counsel to impeach the defendant’s expert during a deposition.  Id. 
at 1095.  The Supreme Court of California upheld the trial court’s determination that the 
notes were “absolutely privileged by the work product rule.” Id. at 1096, because they 
amounted to “an attorney’s written notes about a witness’s statements.”  Id. at 1096-97.  
The court explained that, “[w]hen a witness’s statement and the attorney’s impressions 
are inextricably intertwined, the work product doctrine provides that absolute protection 
is afforded to all of the attorney’s notes.”  Id. at 1097.  The court adopted the rule that an 
attorney should refrain from unnecessary examination and notify the sender “where it is 
reasonably apparent that the materials were provided or made available through 
inadvertence.”  Id. at 1099.  The California court rejected the defendant’s argument that 
use was justified because the plaintiff’s expert was lying.  Id. at 1100.  The court 
explained that “once the court determines that the writing is absolutely privileged, the 
inquiry ends. Courts do not make exceptions based on the content of the writing.”  Id. at 
1100-01. 
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advocates, and—perhaps more importantly—the recognition that the effect 
of such inadvertent transmissions should play out in the court-supervised 
world of privilege rather than in the disciplinary world of ethics. 
 
D.  METADATA 
[48]  Perhaps the most fascinating new ethics issue (of any variety) 
involves the bars’ attitude toward “metadata”—the invisible “data about 
data” that often accompanies an electronic document transmission sent via 
e-mail.116  Such metadata can include valuable information about a 
document’s authors, dates of creation, earlier drafts, changes, etc.117  
Transactional lawyers would love to know of an adversary’s evolving 
thoughts about price, purchase terms, etc. that might be reflected in earlier 
versions of the adversary’s deal documents.  A litigator could gain a 
significant advantage by learning their adversary’s now-discarded 
arguments in briefs, initial factual statements contained in earlier versions 
of interrogatory answers, etc. 
 
[49]  This inherently interesting issue has played out in an equally 
fascinating display of various states’ differing approaches to receiving 
lawyers’ ethical responsibilities.  Anyone looking for the best current 
paradigm of ethics rules should focus on metadata.  If ethics rules 
represented some timeless moral principles, one would expect state bars to 
take essentially the same approach.  After all, every state bar’s ethics 
committee consists of experienced, intelligent, professional, and ethically 
aware bar leaders.118  Yet the evolution of state bars’ approach to metadata 
shows the true nature of ethics rules—which simply try to balance 
lawyers’ duties to their clients and lawyers’ possible duties to others in the 
legal system. 
 
[50]  As so frequently occurs, New York State was the first state bar to 
deal with metadata.  In 2001, the New York State Bar held that the general 
ethics prohibition on deceptive conduct prohibits New York lawyers from 
“get[ting] behind” electronic documents sent by adversaries who failed to 
                                                 
116 See W. Lawrence Wescott, The Increasing Importance of Metadata in Electronic 
Discovery, 14 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 10, ¶ 1 (2008). 
117 See id. ¶ 3. 
118 See, e.g., Virginia Legal Foundation: Committee on Continuing Legal Education, 
http://www.vacle.org/clecomm.htm. 
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disable the “tracking” software.119  Interestingly, the New York State Bar 
issued legal ethics opinion 782 three years later, indicating that lawyers 
have an ethical duty to “use reasonable care when transmitting documents 
by e-mail to prevent the disclosure of metadata containing client 
confidences or secrets.”120 
 
[51]  The Florida Bar followed the New York approach—warning lawyers 
to be careful when they send metadata, but prohibiting the receiving 
lawyer from examining the metadata.121  Lawyers must take “reasonable 
steps” to protect the confidentiality of any information they transmit, 
including metadata.122   
 
It is the recipient lawyer’s concomitant obligation, upon 
receiving an electronic communication or document from 
another lawyer, not to try to obtain from metadata 
information relating to the representation of the sender’s 
client that the recipient knows or should know is not 
intended for the recipient.  Any such metadata is to be 
considered by the receiving lawyer as confidential 
information which the sending lawyer did not intend to 
transmit.123 
 
[52]  These positions, however, are not reconcilable with Florida Rule 4-
4.4(b), which requires the receiving lawyer to “promptly notify the 
sender” if the receiving lawyer “inadvertently obtains information from 
metadata that the recipient knows or should know was not intended for the 
recipient [lawyer]” but does not prevent the recipient from reading or 
relying upon the inadvertently transmitted communication.124  The Florida 
opinion explicitly avoids addressing metadata “in the context of 
documents that are subject to discovery under applicable rules of court or 
law.”125 
 
                                                 
119 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 749 (2001). 
120 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Formal Op. 782 (2004). 
121 Prof’l Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Formal Op. 06-2 (2006). 
122 Id. 
123 Id. 
124 See RULES REGULATING THE FLA. BAR R. 4-4.4(b) (2006). 
125 Prof’l Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Formal Op. 06-2 (2006). 
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[53]  In 2006, the ABA took exactly the opposite position—holding that 
the receiving lawyer may freely examine metadata.126  As long as the 
receiving lawyer did not obtain an electronic document in an improper 
manner, the lawyer may ethically examine the document’s metadata, 
including even using “more thorough or extraordinary investigative 
measures” that “might permit the retrieval of embedded information that 
the provider of electronic documents either did not know existed, or 
thought was deleted.”127  The opinion does not analyze whether the 
transmission of such metadata is “inadvertent,” but at most such an 
inadvertent transmission would require the receiving lawyer to notify the 
sending lawyer of the metadata’s receipt.128  Lawyers “sending or 
producing” electronic documents can take steps to avoid transmitting 
metadata through new means such as scrubbing software, or more 
traditional means such as faxing the document.129  Lawyers can also 
negotiate confidentiality agreements or protective orders allowing the 
“client to ‘pull back,’ or prevent the introduction of evidence based upon, 
the document that contains that embedded information or the information 
itself.”130 
 
[54]  Maryland then followed this ABA approach.131  Absent some 
agreement with the receiving lawyer, the sending lawyer “has an ethical 
obligation to take reasonable measures to avoid the disclosure of 
confidential or work product materials imbedded in the electronic 
discovery,” although not every inadvertent disclosure constitutes an ethics 
violation.132  There is no ethical violation if a lawyer or the lawyer’s 
assistant “reviews or makes use of the metadata [received from another 
person] without first ascertaining whether the sender intended to include 
such metadata.”133  The opinion points to the absence in the Maryland 
Rules of any provision requiring the recipient of inadvertently transmitted 
                                                 
126 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-442 
(2006). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See id. 
130 Id. 
131 Md. State Bar Comm. on Ethics, Formal Op. 2007-09 (2007). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. 
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privileged material to notify the sender.134  A receiving lawyer “can, and 
probably should, communicate with his or her client concerning the pros 
and cons of whether to notify the sending attorney and/or to take such 
other action which they believe is appropriate.”135  The opinion notes that 
the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will 
supersede the Maryland ethics provisions at least in federal litigation, and 
that violating that new provision would likely constitute a violation of 
Rule 8.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct as being 
“prejudicial to the administration of justice.”136 
 
[55]  In early 2007, the Alabama Bar lined up with the bars prohibiting the 
mining of metadata.137  In Ethics Opinion 2007-02, the Alabama Bar first 
indicated that “an attorney has an ethical duty to exercise reasonable care 
when transmitting electronic documents to ensure that he or she does not 
disclose his or her client’s secrets and confidences.”138  The Alabama Bar 
then dealt with the ethical duties of a lawyer receiving an electronic 
document from another person; the Bar only cited New York Ethics 
Opinion 749, and did not discuss ABA Ethics Opinion 06-442.139  Citing 
Alabama Rule 8.4 (which is the same as Rule 8.4 of the ABA Model Rules 
of Professional Conduct), the Alabama Bar concluded that “[t]he mining 
of metadata constitutes a knowing and deliberate attempt by the recipient 
attorney to acquire confidential and privileged information in order to 
obtain an unfair advantage against an opposing party.”140 
 
[56]  The Alabama Bar did not address Alabama’s approach to 
inadvertently transmitted communications (Alabama does not have a 
corollary to Rule 4.4(b) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct).141  The Alabama Bar acknowledged that “one possible 
exception” to the prohibition on mining metadata involves electronic 
                                                 
134 See id. 
135 Id. 
136 See id. 
137 Ala. State Bar Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. 2007-02 (2007). 
138 Id. 
139 See id.; ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 06-
442 (2006); N.Y. State Bar Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 749 (2001). 
140 Ala. Bar Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. 2007-02 (2007); see MODEL CODE OF PROF’L 
CONDUCT R. 8.4 (2000). 
141 See Ala. Bar Gen. Counsel, Formal Op. 2007-02. 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
 32
discovery, because “metadata evidence may be relevant and material to 
the issues at hand” in litigation.142 
 
[57]  The D.C. Bar dealt with the metadata issue in late 2007.143  The D.C. 
Bar generally agreed with the New York and Alabama approach, but noted 
that as of February 1, 2007, D.C. Rule 4.4(b) is “more expansive than the 
ABA version,” because it prohibits the lawyer from examining an 
inadvertently transmitted writing if the lawyer “knows, before examining 
the writing, that it has been inadvertently sent.”144  The D.C. Bar held that 
 
A receiving lawyer is prohibited from reviewing metadata 
sent by an adversary only where he has actual knowledge 
that the metadata was inadvertently sent.  In such instances, 
the receiving lawyer should not review the metadata before 
consulting with the sending lawyer to determine whether 
the metadata includes work product of the sending lawyer 
or confidences or secrets of the sending lawyer’s client.145 
 
[58]  After having explicitly selected the “actual knowledge” standard, the 
D.C. Bar then proceeded to abandon it.  First, the D.C. Bar indicated that 
lawyers could not use “a system to mine all incoming electronic 
documents in the hope of uncovering a confidence or secret, the disclosure 
of which was unintended by some hapless sender.”146  The Bar warned 
that “a lawyer engaging in such a practice with such intent cannot escape 
accountability solely because he lacks ‘actual knowledge’ in an individual 
case.”147 
 
[59]  Second, in discussing the “actual knowledge” requirement, the D.C. 
Bar noted the obvious example of the sending lawyer advising the 
receiving lawyer of the inadvertence “before the receiving lawyer reviews 
the document.”148  The D.C. Bar, however, then gave another example that 
appears much closer to a negligence standard: 
                                                 
142 Id. 
143 Legal Ethics Comm. of the D.C. Bar, Formal Op. 341 (2007). 
144 Id. 
145 Id. (emphasis added). 
146 Id. at n.3. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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Such actual knowledge may also exist where a receiving 
lawyer immediately notices upon review of the metadata 
that it is clear that protected information was 
unintentionally included.  These situations will be 
fact-dependent, but can arise, for example, where the 
metadata includes a candid exchange between an adverse 
party and his lawyer such that it is “readily apparent on its 
face,” that it was not intended to be disclosed.149 
 
The D.C. Bar indicated that “a prudent receiving lawyer” should contact 
the sending lawyer in such a circumstance150—although the effect of the 
D.C. Ethics Opinion 341 is to allow ethics sanctions against an imprudent 
lawyer.151 
 
[60]  Third, the D.C. Bar also abandoned the “actual knowledge” 
requirement by using a “patently clear” standard.152  The D.C. Bar 
analogized inadvertently transmitted metadata to a situation in which a 
lawyer “inadvertently leaves his briefcase in opposing counsel’s office 
following a meeting or a deposition.”153 
 
The one lawyer’s negligence in leaving the briefcase does 
not relieve the other lawyer from the duty to refrain from 
going through that briefcase, at least when it is patently 
clear from the circumstances that the lawyer was not 
invited to do so.154 
 
[61]  After describing situations in which the receiving lawyer cannot 
review metadata, the Bar emphasized that even a lawyer who is free to 
examine the metadata is not obligated to do so: 
 
Whether as a matter of courtesy, reciprocity, or efficiency, 
“a lawyer may decline to retain or use documents that the 
                                                 
149 Id. (citations omitted). 
150 Id. 
151 See generally id. (discussing the parameters of a lawyer’s duty). 
152 Id. at nn.3-4. 
153 Id.  
154 Id. 
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lawyer might otherwise be entitled to use, although 
(depending on the significance of the documents) this 
might be a matter on which consultation with the client 
may be necessary.”155 
 
[62]  Unlike some of the other bars which have dealt with metadata, the 
D.C. Bar also explicitly addressed metadata included in responsive 
documents being produced in litigation.156  Interestingly, the D.C. Bar 
noted that other rules might prohibit the removal of metadata during the 
production of electronic documents during discovery.157  Thus,  
 
In view of the obligations of a sending lawyer in providing 
electronic documents in response to a discovery request or 
subpoena, a receiving lawyer is generally justified in 
assuming that metadata was provided intentionally.158 
 
Even in the discovery context, however, a receiving lawyer must comply 
with D.C. Rule 4.4(b) if she has “actual knowledge” that metadata 
containing protected information has been inadvertently included in the 
production.159 
 
[63]  In Ethics Opinion 07-03, the Arizona Bar first indicated that lawyers 
transmitting electronic documents had a duty to take “reasonable 
precautions” to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.160  The 
Arizona Bar nevertheless agreed with those states prohibiting the 
receiving lawyer from mining metadata—noting that Arizona’s Ethical 
Rule 4.4(b) requires a lawyer receiving an inadvertently sent document to 
“promptly notify the sender and preserve the status quo for a reasonable 
period of time in order to permit the sender to take protective 
measures.”161  The Arizona Bar acknowledged that the sending lawyer 
might not have inadvertently sent the document, but explained that the 
                                                 
155 Id. n.9. 
156 Id.  
157 Id. 
158 Id. 
159 Id. 
160 Ariz. Bar Comm. on the Rules of Prof’l Conduct, Formal Op. 07-03 (2007). 
161 Id. 
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lawyer did not intend to transmit metadata—thus triggering Rule 4.4(b).162  
The Arizona Bar specifically rejected the ABA approach, because sending 
lawyers worried about receiving lawyers reading their metadata “might 
conclude that the only ethically safe course of action is to forego the use of 
electronic document transmission entirely.”163 
 
[64]  In Ethics Opinion 2007-500, the Pennsylvania Bar promised that its 
opinion “provides ethical guidance to lawyers on the subject of metadata 
received from opposing counsel in electronic materials,”164 but then offers 
a completely useless standard: 
 
[I]t is the opinion of this Committee that each attorney 
must, as the Preamble to the Rules of Professional Conduct 
states, “resolve [the issue] through the exercise of sensitive 
and moral judgment guided by the basic principles of the 
Rules” and determine for himself or herself whether to 
utilize the metadata contained in documents and other 
electronic files based upon the lawyer’s judgment and the 
particular factual situation.165 
 
The Pennsylvania Bar’s conclusion is equally useless. 
 
Therefore, this Committee concludes that, under the 
Pennsylvania Rules of Professional Conduct, each attorney 
must determine for himself or herself whether to utilize the 
metadata contained in documents and other electronic files 
based upon the lawyer’s judgment and the particular factual 
situation.  This determination should be based upon the 
nature of the information received, how and from whom the 
information was received, attorney-client privilege and 
work product rules, and common sense, reciprocity and 
professional courtesy.166 
 
                                                 
162 See id. 
163 Id. 
164 Pa. Bar Ass’n Comm. on Legal Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 2007-500 
(2007). 
165 Id. (alteration in original). 
166 Id. 
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[65]  The next legal ethics opinion on this issue came from the New York 
County Lawyers’ Association Committee on Professional Ethics.167  In 
Ethics Opinion 738 (2008), the Committee specifically rejected the ABA 
approach, and found that mining an adversary’s electronic documents for 
metadata amounts to unethical conduct that “is deceitful and prejudicial to 
the administration of justice.”168 
 
[66]  Relying on a unique Colorado rule, the Colorado Bar then explained 
that a receiving lawyer may freely examine any metadata unless the 
lawyer received an actual notice from the sending lawyer that the metadata 
was inadvertently included in the transmitted document.169  In addition, 
the Colorado Bar explicitly rejected the conclusion reached by 
jurisdictions prohibiting receiving lawyers from examining metadata.170  
For instance, the Colorado Bar explained that “there is nothing inherently 
deceitful or surreptitious about searching for metadata.”171  The Colorado 
Bar also concluded that “an absolute ethical bar on even reviewing 
metadata ignores the fact that, in many circumstances, metadata do not 
contain Confidential Information.”172 
 
[67]  The most recent state to have voted on metadata is Maine.  In Ethics 
Opinion 196 (2008), the Maine Bar reviewed most of the other opinions 
on metadata, and ultimately concluded that  
 
[A]n attorney may not ethically take steps to uncover 
metadata, embedded in an electronic document sent by 
counsel for another party, in an effort to detect information 
that is legally confidential and is or should be reasonably 
known not to have been intentionally communicated.173 
 
The Maine Bar explained that  
 
                                                 
167 N.Y. County Lawyers Ass’n Comm. on Prof’l Ethics, Op. 738 (2008). 
168 Id. 
169 Ethics Comm. of the Colo. Bar Ass’n, Formal Op. 119 (2008). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
172 Id. 
173 Me. Prof’l Ethics Comm. of the Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Op. 196 (2008). 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
 37
Not only is the attorney’s conduct dishonest in purposefully 
seeking by this method to uncover confidential information 
of another party, that conduct strikes at the foundational 
principles that protect attorney-client confidences, and in 
doing so it clearly prejudices the administration of 
justice.174 
 
Not surprisingly, the Maine Bar also stated that  
 
[T]he sending attorney has an ethical duty to use reasonable 
care when transmitting an electronic document to prevent 
the disclosure of metadata containing confidential 
information.  Undertaking this duty requires the attorney to 
reasonably apply a basic understanding of the existence of 
metadata embedded in electronic documents, the features of 
the software used by the attorney to generate the document 
and practical measures that may be taken to purge 
documents of sensitive metadata where appropriate to 
prevent the disclosure of confidential information.175 
 
[68]  So the box score on metadata represents a nearly even split.  Some 
states allow receiving lawyers to check for metadata that their adversaries 
might have included along with an electronic document, while an almost 
even number of states find such conduct flatly unethical.  It will be 
interesting to see whether any consensus ever develops. 
 
II.  COMMUNICATIONS WITH NON-CLIENTS 
[69]  Although perhaps not as interesting as the ethics issues implicated 
when lawyers communicate by e-mail with adversaries, the ethics rules 
have also had to address lawyers’ electronic communications with non-
adversarial third parties.  These issues arise in a number of settings. 
 
                                                 
174 Id. 
175 Id. 
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A.  WORKING WITH SERVICE PROVIDERS 
[70]  To comply with their broad duty of confidentiality, lawyers must 
take all reasonable steps to assure that anyone with whom they are 
working also protects client confidences.176  For instance, the ABA has 
indicated that a lawyer who allows a computer maintenance company 
access to the law firm’s files must “ensure that the company has in place, 
or will establish, reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality” of 
the information in the files.177  The ABA also indicated that the lawyer 
would be “well-advised to secure” the computer maintenance company’s 
written “assurance of confidentiality.”178 
 
[71]  In its recent decision generally approving outsourcing of legal 
services, the ABA reminded lawyers that they should consider conducting 
due diligence of the foreign legal providers—such as “investigating the 
security of the provider’s premises, computer network, and perhaps even 
its recycling and refuse disposal procedures.”179 
 
[72]  Lawyers must be very careful even when dealing with service 
providers such as copy services.  In Universal City Development Partners, 
Ltd. v. Ride & Show Engineering, Inc.,180 the defendant, Ride & Show 
Engineering (RSE), had filed motions seeking the return of documents that 
it asserted had been inadvertently produced during discovery.181  The 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida highlighted 
RSE’s lawyer’s “most serious failure to protect the privilege [which arose 
from the litigant’s] knowing and voluntary release of privileged 
documents to a third party -- the copying service -- with whom it had no 
confidentiality agreement.”182  Taking these observations in combination 
                                                 
176 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 95-398 
(1995). 
177 Id. 
178 Id. 
179 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 
(2008). 
180 230 F.R.D. 688 (M.D. Fla. 2005). 
181 See id. at 698. 
182 Id.  The court continued by observing that “[h]aving taken the time to review the 
documents and tab them for privilege, RSE’s counsel should have simply pulled the 
documents out before turning them over to the copying service.”  Id.  The court further 
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with the rest of its analysis, the court refused to order the adversary to 
return the inadvertently produced documents.183 
 
B.  DONATING ELECTRONIC FILES TO INSTITUTIONS 
[73]  In a context that interests historians as much as practicing lawyers, 
bars have also had to deal with a lawyer’s ability to share client 
confidences with institutions which might make them available to later 
historians.  This issue has always existed, but as in so many other areas, 
historical trends have exacerbated the dilemma.  Not only have lawyers 
played an increasing role in making history (thus, attracting historians’ 
interest in their communications), but those lawyers increasingly 
communicate by e-mail.  
 
[74]  The ethical duty of confidentiality and the attorney-client privilege 
last forever.184  A number of state legal ethics opinions have explained that 
lawyers may not—without consent following full disclosure of every 
client affected—donate their files to research libraries or other third 
parties.185  Unfortunately, there is no exception for papers even of 
historical significance. 
 
C.  DISCARDING ELECTRONIC FILES 
[75]  The increasing use of electronic communications has highlighted 
another ethics issue that has always existed—the care with which lawyers 
must discard obsolete and unwanted communications with their clients.  
Lawyers throwing out their trash have always had to deal with this issue, 
                                                                                                                         
opined that “RSE also failed to protect its privilege by promptly reviewing the work 
performed by the outside copying service.”  Id. 
183 Id. 
184 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6 cmt. 18 (2000) (“The duty of 
confidentiality continues after the client-lawyer relationship has terminated.”); see also 
Swidler & Berlin v. United States, 524 U.S. 399 (1998) (holding that the attorney-client 
privilege survived the client’s suicide). 
185 See, e.g., Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 1664 (1995) (stating that a lawyer 
may not provide a former client’s historically significant files to a university without 
either obtaining the client’s consent or determining that the files contain no confidences 
or secrets); Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Op. 928 (1987) (stating that the ethical 
duty of confidentiality continues after a client’s death, and the lawyer may not turn over 
the client’s files to an institution). 
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but now must remember the surprising permanence of the electronic 
impulses that comprise electronic communications.  The sloppy handling 
of client confidences can violate a lawyer’s duty of confidentiality, and 
also result in waiver of the attorney-client privilege.186  In its recent 
decisions generally approving outsourcing of legal services, the ABA 
reminded lawyers that they should consider conducting due diligence of 
the foreign legal providers—such as “investigating the security of the 
provider’s premises, computer network, and perhaps even its recycling 
and refuse disposal procedures.”187 
 
[76]  The most frightening form of inadvertent express waiver is 
exemplified by Suburban Sew    ’N Sweep, Inc. v. Swiss-Bernina, Inc.188  
In Suburban, the plaintiff sifted through the defendant’s trash dumpster for 
two years.189  This unpleasant task yielded hundreds of discarded 
documents, several privileged.190  The United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Illinois held that the defendants had not taken 
reasonable steps to ensure complete obliteration of the documents (such as 
shredding) and, therefore, had expressly waived the privilege.191  Under 
this approach, the negligent discarding of documents, not just the 
negligent handling of documents or the negligent production of documents 
to an opponent, can amount to a waiver.192 
 
[77]  Other courts take a more forgiving approach, and find that clients do 
not waive the attorney-client privilege if they take reasonable steps when 
discarding their privileged documents.193  Lawyers attempting to discard 
                                                 
186 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2000); id. R. 1.16(a). 
187 ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 
(2008). 
188 91 F.R.D. 254 (N.D. Ill. 1981). 
189 Id. at 255-56. 
190 Id. at 256. 
191 See id. at 260-61. 
192 See id. at 257-58, 260-61. 
193 See Sparshott v. Feld Entm’t, Inc., No. 99-0551 (JR), 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13800, at 
*2-3 (D.D.C. Sept. 21, 2000) (finding that a discharged employee had not waived the 
attorney-client privilege covering a dictaphone tape recording of conversations with his 
lawyer by failing to take the tape from his office after he was fired); McCafferty’s, Inc. v. 
Bank of Glen Burnie, 179 F.R.D. 163, 169-70 (D. Md. 1998) (finding that client had not 
waived the attorney-client privilege by discarding a privileged document by tearing it into 
smaller pieces and throwing it in the trash). 
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repositories of electronic communications (such as computer hard drives) 
must remember both their ethical duty of confidentiality and the risks to 
the attorney-client privilege.   
 
III.  LITIGATION ISSUES 
A.  OUTSOURCING OF DISCOVERY WORK 
[78]  The advent of e-mails and other forms of electronic communications 
have affected how and from where lawyers and their assistants can 
perform legal services.  This new form of providing legal services 
implicates everything from multi-jurisdictional practice (because lawyers 
in one state can virtually “practice law” in another state using electronic 
communications) to the hotly discussed method of outsourcing legal work 
overseas.194  Lawyers analyzing these issues must protect their clients 
from real risks,195 while avoiding the sort of “guild mentality” that will 
prevent the lawyer from exploring all of the options that might save the 
client money.196 
 
[79]  The ABA and state bars are still wrestling with the ethics 
implications of foreign outsourcing.197  The ABA has explicitly explained 
that lawyers may hire “contract” lawyers to assist in projects—although 
the ABA focused on billing questions.198  State bars have also dealt with 
                                                 
194 See, e.g., Cassie B. Hanson, Time for a Virtual Revolution, MINNESOTA LAWYER, 
Nov. 3, 2008, available at http:/www.mncourts.gov/lprb/fc08/fc110308.html. 
195 See, e.g., Posting of Avoiding the Unauthorized Practice of Law in Other Jurisdictions 
When Practicing Law Online to http://kimbrolaw.blogspot.com/2008/06/avoiding-
unauthorized-practice-of-law.html (June 9, 2008, 22:50:00 EST). 
196 See, e.g., https://www.kimbrolaw.com/about.phtml. 
197 See Lisa R. Bliss, ABA Ethics Opinion Guides Lawyers in Outsourcing, LITIGATION 
NEWS, Nov. 5, 2008, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/litigationnews/top_stories/article_ethics.html. 
198 ABA Standing Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 420 (2000).  A law firm 
hiring a contract lawyer may either bill his or her time as:  (1) fees, in which case the 
client would have a “reasonable expectation” that the contract lawyer has been 
supervised, and the law firm can add a surcharge without disclosure to the client, 
although some state bars and courts require disclosure of both the hiring and the 
surcharge, or (2) costs, in which case the law firm can only bill the actual cost incurred 
“plus those costs that are associated directly with the provision of services.”  Id.   The 
ABA states that temporary lawyers must comply with all ethics rules arising from a 
lawyer’s representation of a client, but depending on the facts, such as whether the 
Richmond Journal of Law & Technology Volume XV, Issue 4 
 
 42
ethics issues implicated by lawyers employing “temps” and “independent 
contractor” lawyers. 199  Law firms hiring such lawyers and those lawyers 
themselves must also follow the unauthorized practice of law rules of the 
jurisdiction in which they will be practicing.200 
 
[80]  These opinions previewed the more recent issue involving law firms 
relying on distant assistance in serving their clients.  In recent years, the 
New York City Bar,201 the San Diego Bar,202 the Florida Bar203 and the 
                                                                                                                         
temporary lawyer “has access to information relating to the representation of firm clients 
other than the clients on whose matters the lawyer is working” may not be considered 
“associated” with law firms for purposes of the imputed disqualification rules (the firm 
should screen such temporary lawyers from other representations).  ABA Standing 
Comm. on Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 88-356 (1988).  Further, lawyers hiring 
temporary lawyers to perform “independent work for a client without the close 
supervision of a lawyer associated with the law firm” must obtain the client’s consent 
after full disclosure.  Id.  Additionally, lawyers need not obtain the client’s consent to 
having temporary lawyers working on the client matters if the temporary lawyers are 
“working under the direct supervision of a lawyer associated with the firm.”   Id.  
Lawyers need not advise clients of the compensation arrangement for temporary lawyers 
“assuming that a law firm simply pays the temporary lawyer reasonable compensation for 
the services performed for the firm and does not charge the payments thereafter to the 
client as a disbursement.”  Id.  
199 Va. State Bar Comm. on Legal Ethics, Formal Op. 1712 (1998). 
200 See, e.g., D.C. Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Op. 16-05 (2005) (noting 
that contract lawyers who are performing the work of lawyers rather than paralegals or 
law clerks must join the D.C. Bar if they work in D.C. or “regularly” take “short-term 
assignments” in D.C.). 
201 The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. on Prof’l and Judicial Ethics, Formal 
Op. 2006-3 (2006).  The New York City bar assessed the ethics ramifications of New 
York lawyers outsourcing legal support services overseas.  Id.  It distinguished between 
the outsourcing of “substantive legal support services” and “administrative legal support 
services” such as transcriptions, accounting services, clerical support, data entry, etc.  Id.  
It held that New York lawyers may ethically outsource such substantive services if they: 
(1) avoid aiding non-lawyers in the unauthorized practice of law, which requires that the 
lawyer “must at every step shoulder complete responsibility for the non-lawyer’s work.  
In short, the lawyer must, by applying professional skill and judgment, first set the 
appropriate scope for the non-lawyer’s work and then vet the non-lawyer’s work and 
ensure its quality;” (2) adequately supervise the overseas workers, which requires that the 
 
New York lawyer must be both vigilant and creative in discharging the 
duty to supervise.  Although each situation is different, among the 
salutary steps in discharging the duty to supervise that the New York 
lawyer should consider are to (a) obtain background information about 
any intermediary employing or engaging the non-lawyer, and obtain the 
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professional résumé of the non-lawyer; (b) conduct reference checks; 
(c) interview the non-lawyer in advance, for example, by telephone or 
by voice-over-internet protocol or by web cast, to ascertain the 
particular non-lawyer’s suitability for the particular assignment; and (d) 
communicate with the non-lawyer during the assignment to ensure that 
the non-lawyer understands the assignment and that the non-lawyer is 
discharging the assignment according to the lawyer’s expectations;  
 
(3) preserve the client’s confidences, suggesting “[m]easures that New York lawyers may 
take to help preserve client confidences and secrets when outsourcing overseas include 
restricting access to confidences and secrets, contractual provisions addressing 
confidentiality and remedies in the event of breach, and periodic reminders regarding 
confidentiality;” (4) avoid conflicts of interest, advising that  
 
As a threshold matter, the outsourcing New York lawyer should ask the 
intermediary, which employs or engages the overseas non-lawyer, 
about its conflict-checking procedures and about how it tracks work 
performed for other clients.  The outsourcing New York lawyer should 
also ordinarily ask both the intermediary and the non-lawyer 
performing the legal support service whether either is performing, or 
has performed, services for any parties adverse to the lawyer’s client.  
The outsourcing New York lawyer should pursue further inquiry as 
required, while also reminding both the intermediary and the 
non-lawyer, preferably in writing, of the need for them to safeguard the 
confidences and secrets of their other current and former clients; 
 
(5) bill appropriately, noting that  
 
By definition, the non-lawyer performing legal support services 
overseas is not performing legal services.  It is thus inappropriate for 
the New York lawyer to include the cost of outsourcing in his or her 
legal fees.  Absent a specific agreement with the client to the contrary, 
the lawyer should charge the client no more than the direct cost 
associated with outsourcing, plus a reasonable allocation of overhead 
expenses directly associated with providing that service; 
 
(6) obtain the client’s consent when necessary, as  
 
[T]here is little purpose in requiring a lawyer to reflexively inform a 
client every time that the lawyer intends to outsource legal support 
services overseas to a non-lawyer.  But the presence of one or more 
additional considerations may alter the analysis:  for example, if 
(a) non-lawyers will play a significant role in the matter, e.g., several 
non-lawyers are being hired to do an important document review; 
(b) client confidences and secrets must be shared with the non-lawyer, 
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North Carolina Bar204 have all approved foreign outsourcing of legal 
services.  The ABA joined this chorus in July 2008.205 
 
[81]  Although there are some variations among these bars’ analyses 
regarding the outsourcing of discovery work, all of them take the same 
basic approach.  To begin, lawyers must avoid aiding non-lawyers in the 
unauthorized practice of law.206  Doing so requires lawyers to take 
responsibility for all of the outsourced work, ultimately adopting the 
outsourced work as their own.207  Additionally, lawyers must provide 
                                                                                                                         
in which case informed advance consent should be secured from the 
client; (c) the client expects that only personnel employed by the law 
firm will handle the matter; or (d) non-lawyers are to be billed to the 
client on a basis other than cost, in which case the client’s informed 
advance consent is needed. 
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
202 See generally San Diego County Bar Ass’n Legal Ethics Comm., Op. 2007-1 (2007) 
(assessing a situation in which a lawyer in a two-lawyer firm was retained to defend a 
“complex intellectual property dispute” although he was not experienced in intellectual 
property litigation in which the attorney outsourced to an Indian firm). 
203 See generally Prof’l Ethics of the Fla. Bar, Op. 07-2 (2008):  
 
[L]awyer should be mindful of any obligations under law regarding 
disclosure of sensitive information of opposing parties and third parties 
. . . [t]he committee believes that the law firm should obtain prior client 
consent to disclose information that the firm reasonably believes is 
necessary to serve the client’s interests. . . In determining whether a 
client should be informed of the participation of the overseas provider 
an attorney should bear in mind factors such as whether a client would 
reasonably expect the lawyer or law firm to personally handle the 
matter and whether the non-lawyers will have more than a limited role 
in the provision of the services . . . [t]he law firm may charge a client 
the actual cost of the overseas provider, unless the charge would 
normally be covered as overhead. 
 
Id. 
204 See generally N.C. State Bar Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
2007-12 (2008) (analogizing foreign outsourcing and lawyers’ reliance on the services of 
“any nonlawyer assistant.”). 
205 See generally ABA Standing Comm. on Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 
08-451 (2008) (approving the use of outsourcing of legal services). 
206 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.5(a) (2000). 
207 See id. R. 5.3. 
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some degree of supervision, however, the exact nature and degree of the 
supervision is far from clear.208  They should consider such steps while 
researching the entity that will conduct the outsourced work, conducting 
reference checks, interviewing the individuals who will handle the 
outsourced work, describing the specific work that the lawyers will 
require, and reviewing final product before adopting it as their own. 
 
[82]  At the same time, lawyers must assure that the organization they hire 
adequately protects the client’s confidences.  This duty might involve 
confirming that the foreign lawyers’ ethics are compatible with ours, and 
may also require some analysis of the confidentiality precautions and 
technologies that the foreign organization uses.  Meanwhile, lawyers 
arranging outsourcing should avoid conflicts of interest.209  At the very 
least the lawyers should assure that the organization handling the 
outsourced work is not working for the adversary as well.210  Some of the 
bars warn lawyers to take this step to avoid the inadvertent disclosure of 
confidential communications rather than to avoid conflicts.211 
 
[83]  With the aforementioned steps in mind, lawyers must bill 
appropriately.212  As explained earlier, if the lawyers are not “adding 
value” to the outsourced workers, they should pass along the outsourcing 
bill directly to their client as an expense.  In such a situation, a lawyer may 
generally add overhead expenses to the bill.213  The ABA notes, however, 
that there will be very few overhead expenses in pursing a foreign 
outsourcing operation.   
 
[84]  Lastly, lawyers usually must advise their clients that they are 
involving another organization in their work.214  As various legal ethics 
opinions explain, such disclosure may not be required if the contract or 
                                                 
208 See id. 
209 See id. R. 1.7(a). 
210 Id. 
211 See, e.g., The Ass’n of the Bar of the City of N.Y. Comm. On Prof’l and Judicial 
Ethics, Formal Op. 2001-1 (2001). 
212 See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.5 (2000). 
213 ABA Standing Comm. On Ethics and Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Op. 08-451 
(2008). 
214 See id. 
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temporary lawyers act under the direct supervision of the law firm.215  
Nevertheless, disclosure is always best, and almost surely would be 
required in a situation involving a foreign law organization.216  For 
instance, the ABA indicated that the lawyer’s lack of immediate 
supervision and control over foreign service providers means that they 
must obtain the client’s consent to send work overseas.217  The North 
Carolina Bar indicated that lawyers arranging for outsourcing must always 
obtain their clients’ written informed consent.218   Unlike the issue of 
metadata and the inadvertent transmission of electronic communications, 
state bars have reached a general consensus on the ethical permissibility of 
foreign outsourcing.  It will be interesting to see if the market drives law 
firms and their clients to keep expanding that practice. 
 
B.  DUTY TO RETAIN E-MAIL COMMUNICATIONS 
[85]  The obligation of any litigant, or possible litigant, to preserve 
potentially responsive evidence obviously does not present a new issue. 
Conversely, the enormous volume of electronic communications clearly 
makes the analysis more difficult, and exacerbates the possible burden.  It 
should go without saying that litigants must preserve potentially 
responsive documents, including electronic ones.219  The duty obviously 
arises before a discovery request arrives and can also arise before 
litigation begins.220 
 
[86]  The most widely quoted standard comes from the Southern District 
of New York.221  In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg (Zubulake I),222 the United 
States District for the Southern District of New York court held that “the 
obligation to preserve evidence arises . . . when a party should have known 
that the evidence may be relevant to future litigation.”223  Furthermore, the 
                                                 
215 See id. 
216 See id. 
217 Id. 
218 N.C. State Bar, Formal Ethics Op. 2007-12 (2008). 
219 See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii). 
220 Id. 
221 Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Fujitsu Ltd. 
v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d 423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001)).  
222 220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). 
223 Id. at 216. 
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court found that officials at UBS Warburg were on notice that the plaintiff 
might sue the company for gender discrimination, thus triggering the 
preservation duty.224 
 
[87]  In discussing the scope of a company’s duty to preserve, the 
Zubulake I court rejects a blanket duty: 
 
Must a corporation, upon recognizing the threat of 
litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or 
electronic document, and every backup tape?  The answer 
is clearly, “no.”  Such a rule would cripple large 
corporations, like UBS, that are almost always involved in 
litigation.  As a general rule, then, a party need not preserve 
all backup tapes even when it reasonably anticipates 
litigation.225 
 
Instead, the court explained that a company that anticipates being sued 
“must not destroy unique, relevant evidence that might be useful to an 
adversary.”226  The court held that the preservation duty extends to all 
“key players” in the anticipated litigation.227 
 
[88]  Later, in Zubulake II,228 the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York reaffirmed that UBS should have preserved 
electronic documents that were ultimately destroyed.229  It again ordered 
UBS Warburg to pay the cost of the plaintiff’s motion, directed the 
company to reimburse plaintiff for the costs of any depositions or re-
depositions necessitated by the document destruction, and approved a jury 
instruction containing an adverse inference about the destroyed back-up 
tapes.230 
 
                                                 
224 See id. at 216-17. 
225 Id. at 217. 
226 Id. 
227 Id. at 218. 
228 229 F.R.D 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
229 Id. at 439. 
230 See id. 
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[89]  Other courts have essentially adopted the same standard, although 
sometimes using different language.231  Large companies have found 
themselves severely punished for destroying electronic documents under 
this standard.  For instance, a court ordered Philip Morris to pay $2.75 
million as a sanction for not preserving relevant e-mails, and also 
prohibited Philip Morris from relying on the testimony of any of its 
executives who had not saved their e-mails.232  Morgan Stanley also lost a 
highly publicized Florida state court case involving allegations of 
document spoliation.233  The verdict against Morgan Stanley was 
approximately $1.5 billion.234  In perhaps the most frightening new 
development, a court pointed to a litigant’s work product claim, reflected 
on its privilege log, as triggering a duty to have preserved pertinent 
documents— starting on the day that the company created the purportedly 
work-product protected document.235 
                                                 
231 See, e.g., E*Trade Sec. LLC v. Deutsche Bank AG, 230 F.R.D. 582 (D. Minn. 2005) 
(explaining that a litigant asserting a spoliation claim must show bad faith if its adversary 
destroyed documents before the appropriate “trigger date”, when a party knows or should 
have known that the evidence is relevant to the future or current litigation,” but they need 
not show bad faith if documents are destroyed after that date.); Broccoli v. Echostar 
Commc’ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506 (D. Md. 2005) (holding that a company had engaged in 
spoliation and that when Broccoli made numerous complaints regarding an employee’s 
inappropriate behavior throughout 2001, which was communicated verbally and via 
email, the company should have started saving documents as of that time). 
232 United States v. Phillip Morris USA, Inc., 327 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C. 2004). 
233 Landon Thomas, Jury Tallies Morgan’s Total at  $1.45 Billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 5, 
2005, at C1; see also Michael Christie, Morgan Stanley Case Highlights Email Perils, 
REUTERS, May 20, 2005. 
234 Thomas, supra note 240. 
235 Anderson v. Sotheby’s Inc. Severance Plan, No. 04 Civ. 8180 (SAS), 2005 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 23517, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 11, 2005): 
 
A duty to preserve evidence arises when the party in possession of the 
evidence is notified of its relevance.  A party is on notice once it 
receives a discovery request or the complaint alerts the party that 
certain information will likely be sought in discovery.  However, “the 
obligation to preserve evidence even arises prior to the filing of a 
complaint where a party is on notice that litigation is likely to be 
commenced.” 
 
Id.  See generally Anderson v. Sotheby’s Inc. Severance Plan, No. 04 Civ. 8180 (SAS) 
(DFE), 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9033, at 23 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 2005) (stating that the 
withheld documents “appear” to be documents that the defendants created in the 
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[90]  Another court addressed a situation in which a defendant accused of 
spoliation argued that it had not anticipated litigation until 2002, which 
was after it had destroyed the pertinent documents.236  When the defendant 
claimed work product protection for documents created before 2002, the 
plaintiff argued against such protection.237  The court rejected plaintiff’s 
argument, noting that “the court made no finding with regard to alleged 
spoliation or anticipation of litigation that would serve to penalize 
[defendant] Great Lakes from making any claim of work-product privilege 
for documents created prior to filing suit.”238  Although it was not stated as 
bluntly as it could, this decision essentially declined to equate the mental 
states:  (1) required to assert work product protection, and (2) triggering 
the duty to save responsive documents.239 
 
[91]  The law concerning the duty to retain email communications is 
evolving. Unfortunately, the law in this area has not yet reached a point 
where companies can make rational decisions about exactly when to begin 
preserving e-mails, and the scope of the preservation.  No court seems to 
have required companies to preserve all of their e-mails simply because 
they might at some point be sued.  On the other hand, a company’s duty to 
preserve electronic communication begins before a company files a 
lawsuit, or is sued by a plaintiff.240 
 
[92]  It appears that courts might use the same “trigger” date for the duty 
to preserve electronic communication as they use when assessing a work 
product claim.  Companies should keep this in mind before picking an 
aggressively early date to begin a work product protection claim.  Recent 
changes to Rules 16 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure will 
presumably focus companies’ attention on this matter, which might reduce 
the likelihood that companies will find themselves in this position. 
                                                                                                                         
“ordinary course of assessing an employee’s beneficiary’s claim for a large severance 
benefit). 
236 See Albemarle Corp. v. Great Lakes Chemical Corp., Civ. A. No. 02-506-A-M3, 2008 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4710, at *3-5 (M.D. La. Jan. 22, 2008). 
237 Id. at *6. 
238 Id. 
239 See id. 
240 See Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC (Zubulake I), 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y 
2003). 
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CONCLUSION 
[93]  Because today’s lawyers are trying to deal with the changes triggered 
by the expanding use of e-mails, it might be difficult for all of them to see 
what a dramatic change they represent.  It will be interesting to see how 
the ethics rules continue to adapt as new forms of electronic 
communications supplement, or even replace e-mails.  With texting, 
instant messaging, and new forms of instant communication expanding, 
we may soon look back at the era of e-mails as the “good old days” when 
ethics rules could adequately address modern technology.   
